Globally, race-based affirmative action (AA) is often viewed as a remedy to fix historical racial discrimination (Drucza, 2017; Harris, 1993; Sabbagh, 2011). In Malaysia, AA is usually studied within a material or resource paradigm that is, AA's roles in reducing inequalities, building capabilities or enhancing opportunities (Agadjanian & Peng Liew, 2005; Lee, 2021; Lee & Khalid, 2016; Pong, 1995)—what I call the objective domain. It contributes to the popular imagination that contestations over AA revolve around struggles for resources, and preferences for AA pivot around relative access to and gains from these resources. This approach, while not wrong, is incomplete. The exclusive focus on the objective domain limits understanding of how perceptions, attitudes and identities—what I call the subjective domain, bear on questions of resources, and play a constitutive role in shaping the politics of AA and racial inequalities.
Against this backdrop, the aim of this paper is to situate AA in the subjective domain of racial identities and social attitudes. The objective is to examine the racial identity modes of Bumiputeras in Malaysia, the intended beneficiaries of AA, and their social attitudes towards the AA regime. More specifically, I am guided by the following research question: “How do the racial identity modes of Malay Bumiputera youths shape their social attitudes towards race-based AA in Malaysia?”
Malaysia's AA regime, with preferential treatment for the politically dominant but economically disadvantaged majority group (Lee, 2021), encompasses entrenched and far-reaching interventions in education, employment, entrepreneurship, wealth ownership and land. The Bumiputera is a postcolonial category used to bring together multiple racial and ethnic subgroups deemed as “native” to Malaysia, where the Malays constitute the largest and dominant sub-group.
AA and race continue to be central to the political economic discourse in Malaysia. The Pakatan Harapan (PH) government, largely perceived to be championing reforms of race-based AA, came into power in May 2018, the first change of government since the country's independence in 1957. However, the PH coalition fell apart in March 2020, with a small faction from the PH government defecting and forming an alliance with opposition parties, uniting around race and religion to form the Perikatan Nasional (PN) government, a reversion to a race-centric coalition assuming political power. AA, also known as the Bumiputera Development Agenda, was then placed under the direct purview of the Prime Minister in September 2020. This followed a resolution put forward in the Bumiputera Economic Congress organised in the same month, underscoring the importance of AA in maintaining the power base of the new coalition. However, the links between preferences for AA and race-based politics must not be simplistically assumed (Lee, 2017a).
Based on analysis of in-depth interviews, three key findings are discussed: first, the disjuncture between Malay subjectivities and their colonial construction; second, the contestations over AA that go beyond redistribution to recognition; and third, the reduction of Malay disadvantages to either the race or class axis in these contestations, leaving their intersectional disadvantages unaddressed. The research concludes by arguing that AA can be better understood by incorporating non-elite perspectives, featuring different sites, scales and actors in the reproduction of subjectivities; the political economy of AA has to be seen as both struggles for recognition and redistribution; and the intersectional disadvantages of Bumiputeras must be foregrounded in the reclaiming and reconstruction of AA in Malaysia.
The AA regime in Malaysia can arguably be traced back to three important historical “moments”. First, the constitutional guarantee of AA which came into force when Malaya obtained its independence from the British in 19571. Second, the expansion of AA under the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971, following the racial riots of 1969. Third, the proposal in the New Economic Model (NEM) in 2010 to refashion AA to be “market friendly”, catalysing the popular discourse on need-based and merit-based AA as the way forward.
The special position of the Bumiputera highlighted in the Federal Constitution must be understood within the context of the racial hierarchy produced by the expansion of British colonial capitalism in the region in the late 19th century, which correlated with the economic hierarchy at that time (Brennan, 1982; Jehom, 1999; Lim, 1980; Reid, 1997). Consequently, in Peninsular Malaysia, Malays occupied the lowest rung in the racial-economic hierarchy (Lim, 1980). At the same time, racial differences between natives and non-natives were solidified, influenced by the development of “scientific” European racial theories, which have since been discredited (Hirschman, 1986; Milner, 1998). Although the British occupied the apex of this hierarchy, immigrant non-Malays—mainly Chinese and to a lesser extent Indians—were seen as the main antagonists to Malays. Non-Malays were incorporated into the colonial economy through relations of exchange (instead of relations of production), where they became middle-men in different spaces of production and consumption, and their exploitative roles became more visible (Lim, 1980, 142–144). On the other hand, the British, whose exploitative practices were less visible, was seen as protectors of Malays against the massive influx of non-Malay immigrants. The British signed treaties with the Malay rulers to establish their colonial legitimacy, trained a relatively small cohort of Malay aristocrats to support the colonial administration and left the Malay masses relatively undisturbed in their peasant agricultural economy (Brennan, 1982; Hutchinson, 2015; Lim, 1980).
Therefore, three key tenets underpinned elite bargaining and accommodation in the negotiation with the British for independence: (i) Malays became conscious of themselves as a coherent group with entrenched racial boundaries; (ii) Malays realised that they, as a group, occupied the bottom of the racial-economic hierarchy; and (iii) Malays demanded for protection from the British against the massive influx of non-Malay immigrants (Stenson, 1976). These tenets shaped the formulation of Article 153 in the Federal Constitution, which provided recognition for the special position of the Malays in 1957—extended to natives in Sabah and Sarawak in 1963—and embedded the role of the monarchy as safeguard. The British conceded to the demands for AA led by the Malay aristocratic elites, driven by the strategic need to protect business and political interests in the region against threats from more radical, anti-colonial movements associated with communism at that time (Lim, 1980; Weiss, 2020).
The fact that the constitutional provision of AA was more symbolic than real in addressing historical disadvantages could be seen in the lack of economic progress for Malays between 1957 and 1969. In 1969, foreigners still owned 62.1% share capital in limited companies in Peninsular Malaysia, while Chinese 22.8%, Malays 1.5% and Indians 0.9%. The same pattern of foreign dominance could be seen in the holdings of rubber and oil palm estates (Malaysia, 1971, 39–40). Malay discontents over persistent racial inequalities, fuelled by heightened communal politics, provided the impetus for the racial riots of 1969 (Cham, 1975; Lim, 1980). To remedy the racial imbalance, the NEP—presented in the Second Malaysia Plan and Third Malaysia Plan—was put forward with two prongs: first, to eradicate poverty irrespective of race; and second, to eliminate the identification of race with economic function.
Although the NEP has been vehemently debated and criticised over the years (Alatas, 1972, Jomo & Gomez, 2000, Lee, 2021), there are anti-colonial elements in the NEP that have not been given sufficient acknowledgement, perhaps overshadowed by its subsequent neo-colonial permutations. The NEP attributed racial and economic imbalances to “colonial policies” and “economic development during the colonial era” (Malaysia, 1971, 41). The second prong of the NEP explicitly aimed to restructure the racial-economic hierarchy which was seen as a colonial legacy. Furthermore, the NEP recognised the dominance and control of foreign capital in the economy, established clear targets to reduce foreign ownership and ushered the shift away from laissez-faire capitalism (Lee, 2021; Malaysia, 1976).
While the NEP formally ended in 1990, its two-prong objectives continue to be central to Malaysia's policy architecture, persisted through the National Development Plan (1991–2000) and National Vision Policy (2000–2010), and lasting until today. In fact, since the NEP, AA has been expanded significantly in terms of the scale and scope of the programmes. More contemporary assessments of AA have been mixed, highlighting tangible benefits but also pressing concerns (Lee, 2021; Lee & Khalid, 2020). Critics also point to the role of AA in facilitating patronage politics by creating the conditions and opportunities for rent-seeking (de Micheaux, 2017, Jomo & Gomez, 2000). Despite these mixed results and trenchant criticisms, existing surveys suggest robust support among Bumiputeras for AA. However, these preferences could refer to different programmes and underpinned by different rationalities, inherently limited by survey methods that probe broad terminologies (Lee, 2017a).
Following the incumbent Barisan Nasional (BN) government's loss of its long-held two-thirds parliamentary majority in 2008, contributed by the loss of non-Bumiputera votes (O'Shannassy, 2009), the government announced the NEM in 2010, calling for AA to be “market friendly”. The NEM was vague on details but called for a move from “the excessive focus on ethnicity” to needs and merits as guiding principles in redesigning AA (NEAC, 2010). Political resistance ensued and the government eventually backtracked on the NEM, but need-based AA had, by then, been etched into public consciousness despite its contradictions and incoherence (Lee, 2017b, 12; 2021, 42).
This historical snapshot suggests that subjectivities surrounding AA are not straightforward, rooted in the colonial legacy of racial categorisation and stratification, and influenced by subsequent material development in postcolonial Malaysia. Therefore, theorising the subjective domain should ideally be grounded in a framework that can encompass its relations to the objective domain.